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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 05-1005, 05-2637 & 12-1739 
 ___________ 
 
 SIDITA SOKOLI, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A095-869-675) 
 Immigration Judge:  Daniel A. Meisner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 26, 2012 
 Before:  RENDELL, VANASKIE AND GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed October 2, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Nearly eight years after the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) directed that 
Sidita Sokoli be deported to her native Albania—during which time four subsequent 
agency decisions were issued and a total of three petitions for review were filed—we are 
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finally asked to decide whether to endorse the final order of removal in this case.  Having 
carefully considered the original administrative record, the supplemental administrative 
record, the original round of briefs, and the supplemental briefs, we will deny all three of 
Sokoli’s petitions for review.  
I.  Background 
 Sokoli was last admitted to the United States in July 2000, so that she could 
continue to pursue an undergraduate degree from St. John’s University in New York.1  
Because Sokoli did not immediately depart from the country after graduation, she 
received a Notice to Appear charging her with a failure to maintain status, in violation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).  JA Vol. 2 at 416.  She conceded removability but requested 
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.   
 Sokoli primarily claimed that if removed she would be persecuted on account of 
her father’s affiliation with the Democratic Party in Albania.  At a hearing before the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Sokoli testified that her early years in Albania were spent 
living in a village of forty “persecuted families,” but that she was able to return to her 
hometown of Shkoder following the collapse of the Communist regime in 1990.  JA Vol. 
2 at 100-02.  Sokoli testified that her family’s “political background” made it difficult to 
pursue a good education in Albania, which is why she set out to attend college in the 
United States.  JA Vol. 2 at 105.  Referring to her college years, Sokoli testified that 
                                                 
1
  Sokoli first entered the United States—on an F-1 student visa—in December 
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during one summer sojourn in Albania she and her husband received threatening phone 
calls and letters.  She also testified about an incident where three police officers came to 
the family home with a warrant to search for weapons, one of the officers grabbed Sokoli 
while telling her father that they could take her away “and do whatever . . . with her,” and 
another hit Sokoli’s father over the head with a gun when he tried to wrest his daughter 
from the first officer.  JA Vol. 2 at 113. 
 The IJ denied Sokoli all relief save voluntary departure.  The IJ noted “the incident 
in which a rogue police officer . . .  [struck Sokoli’s] father” and made “crude sexual 
threat[s] towards” Sokoli, but determined that those acts did not rise to the level of 
persecution.  JA Vol. 2 at 63.  The IJ found that none of Sokoli’s family members in 
Albania had been “harmed or targeted” since that incident.  JA Vol. 2 at 61.  In addition, 
the IJ found that the background materials indicated an improved political climate in 
Albania, despite claims that the ruling Socialist Party was merely a “successor in interest” 
to the old, repressive Communist regime.  JA Vol. 2 at 63.   
 In December 2004, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without issuing its own 
opinion and ordered that Sokoli be removed to Albania.  The BIA’s order noted that 
Sokoli had been granted voluntary departure, and it warned her that a failure to depart the 
country within thirty days would carry certain penalties.  Sokoli then filed her first 
petition for review, which was docketed at No. 05-1005. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1998.  She made briefs visits back to Albania during her first two summer recesses.    
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 Around the same time, Sokoli retained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen 
removal proceedings.  She submitted with the motion a copy of her husband’s proposed 
Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative and claimed that she was entitled to an adjustment 
of status.
2
  The motion stated that “[s]upporting documents and materials will be 
submitted within one month.”  JA at 7.  However, no supporting documents were filed.     
 In an April 2005 decision, the BIA denied the motion to reopen on two grounds.  
First, the BIA noted that Sokoli failed to submit necessary documentation, including an 
application for adjustment of status and an affidavit of eligibility for relief.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c).  Second, the BIA held that, even if Sokoli had submitted the required 
documentation, she would be statutorily barred from receiving an adjustment of status 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d), because she failed to comply with the voluntary departure 
provision of the final removal order.  Sokoli filed her second petition for review, and it 
was docketed at No. 05-2637. 
 Thereafter, we granted Sokoli’s unopposed motion to stay consideration of her two 
petitions for review pending adjudication of her husband’s application for a green card.  
We lifted the stay approximately two years later and, subsequently, denied Sokoli’s 
motion to stay removal pending disposition of her petitions for review.  Next, the BIA 
denied Sokoli’s second motion to reopen, concluding that the motion was untimely and 
that sua sponte reopening was not justified by the circumstances.  Sokoli unsuccessfully 
                                                 
2
  Sokoli’s husband—also a native of Albania—acquired status in the United 
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moved the BIA for reconsideration, but has not petitioned for review, of that decision.   
 Sokoli then filed her third motion to reopen, which the BIA denied on three 
grounds:  (1) the motion was time-barred; (2) the motion was number-barred; and (3) the 
motion was “not supported by any affidavits or material new evidence to establish the 
respondent’s claim of past persecution.”  Supp. JA Vol. 2 at 4.  The BIA declined to 
exercise its sua sponte reopening power.  A third petition for review from Sokoli, which 
was docketed at No. 12-1739, followed and was consolidated with Nos. 05-1005 and 05-
2637.  The parties have not made us aware of any additional agency filings by Sokoli, 
and this matter is now ripe for disposition. 
II.  Standards of Review
3
 
  Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the 
IJ’s decision only.  See Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).  The 
IJ’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, subject to established principles of deference 
under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  Employing a substantial evidence standard to test the IJ’s factual findings, we 
deem those findings conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
find to the contrary.  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                             
States as an asylee in 1998.  Supp. JA Vol. 2 at 54-55.  The couple wed in 1999.  
3
  We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal and decisions of the BIA 
that deny motions to reopen.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 
356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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  We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen.  See 
Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  “We give the BIA’s decision 
broad deference and generally do not disturb it unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
III.  Discussion 
 Sokoli’s petitions for review challenge three separate agency decisions.  We will 
address her challenges in chronological order.    
A.  No. 05-1005 
 Sokoli claims that the IJ erred in failing to grant her asylum.  Specifically, Sokoli 
contends that her early years in a village of “persecuted families,” the threatening phone 
calls and letters she received while on a trip to Albania during college, and the incident 
with the three police officers during that same trip, demonstrate that she suffered past 
persecution.  Sokoli also contends that, with respect to future persecution, the IJ gave 
“insufficient weight” to the country conditions evidence in the record.  Pet’r’s Br. at 11. 
  We will deny this petition for review.  Even if we were inclined to agree with 
Sokoli’s contention that she demonstrated past persecution—and we are not so 
inclined
4—we would nevertheless conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s 
                                                 
 4  The IJ’s findings with regard to past persecution are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Sokoli provided little evidence to support a conclusion that growing up in what 
she characterizes as an “internment camp” constituted persecution.  The habitability 
issues described—no electricity, no warm water, a leaky roof, and the fact that she “could 
only eat three times a day,” JA Vol. 2 at 103—lack the requisite severity as a matter of 
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findings that any presumption of persecution was rebutted by changed conditions, see 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), and that Sokoli lacked an objectively reasonable fear of future 
persecution on account of an imputed association with the Albanian Democratic Party.   
 With regard to changed country conditions, the IJ found that the political climate 
in Albania was much improved since the fall of communism. The background evidence 
supports that finding.  For example, the State Department report for 2002 indicates that 
“elections . . . have improved over past elections in terms of the conduct of the campaign 
. . . .”  JA Vol. 2 at 139.  The Albanian Constitution “provides for the right of association, 
and the Government generally respected this right.”  JA Vol. 2 at 144.  In addition, and 
according to an “Immigration & Nationality Directorate,” “[t]he Democratic Party 
remains a legitimate political party that is free to campaign and carry out lawful 
activities.”  JA Vol. 2 at 168.  The State Department report also notes that crimes against 
Democratic Party members were investigated by the Albanian government; in particular, 
“four suspects were convicted and given sentences ranging from 2 ½ years to life in 
                                                                                                                                                             
law.  See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting BIA’s definition of 
persecution as “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe 
that they constitute a threat to life or freedom,” and noting that “the concept of 
persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or 
even unlawful or unconstitutional”).  Regarding the threatening phone calls and letters 
during her second trip back to Albania, the threats do not appear to have been imminent 
or realized.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have 
refused to extend asylum protection for threats that, while sinister and credible in nature, 
were not highly imminent or concrete or failed to result in any physical violence or harm 
to the alien.”)  Finally, the incident with the three police officers, while understandably 
traumatic, did not result in actual harm to Sokoli. 
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prison” for “the 1998 murder of DP leader Azem Hajdari.”  JA Vol. 2 at 140.  And 
“[t]here were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.”  JA Vol. 2 at 140.  
 With regard to future persecution, Sokoli failed to demonstrate either an 
individualized risk of persecution or a pattern or practice of persecution of Albanian 
Democratic Party members.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).  In addition, we consider 
conclusive the IJ’s factual finding that Sokoli’s family has lived harm-free in Albania in 
the years postdating Sokoli’s last admission to the United States.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 
396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We agree that when family members remain in 
petitioner’s native country without meeting harm, and there is no individualized showing 
that petitioner would be singled out for persecution, the reasonableness of a petitioner’s 
well-founded fear of future persecution is diminished.”).   
 Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the IJ’s decision as adopted by the BIA.   
B.  No. 05-2637 
 Sokoli claims that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her first motion to 
reopen.  She concedes, however, that she “did not submit an application for adjustment of 
status,” Pet’r’s Br. at 8, or any evidence purporting to demonstrate that her marriage was 
bona fide, with the exception of her husband’s yet-to-be-approved Form I-130 Petition 
for Alien Relative.  Sokoli nevertheless argues that the BIA should have deemed the I-
130 Petition a sufficient basis to reopen.  In addition, Sokoli acknowledges but provides 
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no real rejoinder to the BIA’s invocation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B) as a temporary bar 
to her status-adjustment request. 
 We will deny this petition for review.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion insofar 
as it denied the motion to reopen on prima facie grounds.  An unadjudicated I-130 
Petition (including several G-325A forms) does not give the BIA sufficient information 
to assess an alien’s eligibility for adjustment of status.  Cf. Hashmi v. Att’y Gen., 531 
F.3d 256, 260 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008) (indicating that under Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), a motion to reopen based on a post-removal-order I-130 
Petition is supposed to demonstrate, inter alia, that the alien’s marriage is bona fide).  
Moreover, Sokoli did not attach to her motion a proposed adjustment of status 
application, in contravention of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  See In re Yewondwosen, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 1025, 1026 (BIA 1997) (en banc) (noting that a “failure to submit an 
application for relief . . . will typically result in the Board’s denial of the motion [to 
reopen].”).  
 We also conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sokoli’s first 
motion to reopen insofar as it relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B), which provides that 
“if an alien is permitted to depart voluntarily under this section and voluntarily fails to 
depart the United States within the time period specified, the alien . . . shall be ineligible, 
for a period of ten years, to receive [cancellation of removal or adjustment of status].”  
The BIA’s December 13, 2004 removal order permitted Sokoli thirty days—until January 
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12, 2005—to voluntarily depart the United States.  Sokoli did not depart, did not 
withdraw her request for voluntary departure during the relevant thirty-day period, and 
did not file her first motion to reopen until March 14, 2005.  JA at 3.  Therefore, with the 
voluntary departure noncompliance penalties in effect, Sokoli was barred from adjusting 
her status as a matter of law.   
 In sum, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sokoli’s first motion to 
reopen.
5
  
C.  No. 12-1739 
 Sokoli claims that “the BIA erred and abused its discretion in denying [her third] 
motion to reopen based on a denial of her right to present evidence of past persecution 
during her merits hearing, a prejudicial denial of due process.”  Pet’r’s Supp. Br. at 20.  
Sokoli also claims that the BIA should have reopened removal proceedings because she 
                                                 
5
  In the closing paragraph of her supplemental brief, Sokoli claims that her first 
petition for review, filed within the thirty-day voluntary departure period, should have 
been construed as a request to extricate herself from the voluntary departure grant and the 
associated penalties for noncompliance.  Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), “[i]f, prior to 
departing the United States, the alien files a petition for review . . . any grant of voluntary 
departure shall terminate automatically upon the filing of the petition[.]”  This regulation 
is intended to protect aliens like Sokoli from the noncompliance penalties should they 
desire further administrative or judicial review of the final order of removal.  Patel v. 
Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 234 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010); Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 
255 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009).  The regulation, however, did not take effect until January 2009, 
see Patel, 619 F.3d at 233, and it is not retroactive.  Therefore, we are unable to construe 
Sokoli’s first petition for review as a withdrawal from voluntary departure. 
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is entitled to so-called Matter of Chen asylum.
6
  Because Sokoli’s claims ignore the 
substance of the BIA’s February 28, 2012 decision, we will deny this petition for review. 
 We first observe that motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the 
date “the final administrative decision was rendered,” and only one such motion is 
allowed under the applicable regulation.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  These time and 
number limitations do not apply, though, when the motion to reopen relies on “changed 
circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and 
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
 Sokoli’s third motion to reopen—filed years after the issuance of the final order of 
removal—was plainly time- and number-barred under the regulations.  Sokoli does not 
suggest otherwise, though she claims, without pointing to any germane authority, that the 
limitations do not apply in her case.  We reject that proposition.  To the extent Sokoli is 
attempting to challenge procedural deficiencies with respect to the IJ’s alleged failure to 
develop the record, we deem that challenge unexhausted, despite Sokoli’s attempt to 
couch it in terms of due process.  See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Furthermore, and as the BIA properly noted, Sokoli failed to submit any new 
evidence in order to satisfy § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
                                                 
6
 Matter of Chen asylum is a strand of “humanitarian” asylum that is available 
when “[t]he applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable 
to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution.”  8 C.F.R. 
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BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte.  See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 
472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 Accordingly, Sokoli has failed to demonstrate that the BIA abused its discretion in 
denying her third motion to reopen. 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the reasons given in this opinion, we will deny each of Sokoli’s three petitions 
for review.  
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A); see Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 162 n.12.    
